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ABSTRACT
Wikipedia is defined by its founders as the “free encyclopedia that anyone
can edit.” This property, we argue, makes Wikipedia a public good and hence
subject to under-provision. A puzzling feature of Wikipedia however is its
enormous size, at roughly seven times that of its commercial counterparts. What
is driving this growth? And how can we assess the reliability of this giant
encyclopedia arising solely from free-editing? We model contribution to
Wikipedia and its reliability. We demonstrate that Wikipedia is indeed subject to
free-riding, and offer a novel explanation for the mitigation of under-provision
under such circumstances. We also find that the public-good feature of Wikipedia
and free-riding introduce a lower-bound in the quality of Wikipedia. This finding
is consistent with a previous empirical study that established Wikipedia‟s
surprisingly high level of quality. We identify Wikipedia as part of a general
Internet phenomenon that we call the Collaborative Net, and that includes
features such as citizen journalism and online reviews.
content
users.”

INTRODUCTION
Wiki, the result of an open-source
effort, is a relatively new technology that
allows Net surfers to freely create and edit
Web page content using any Web browser. It is
remarkably simple technology, and with its
text syntax is equally simple to use. In the
words of the Wiki community:
“Like many simple concepts, „open
editing‟ has some profound and subtle
effects on Wiki usage. Allowing everyday
users to create and edit any page in a
Web site is exciting in that it encourages
democratic use of the Web and promotes

composition

by

nontechnical

Perhaps the most profound, and without
question the most well-known Wiki project is
Wikipedia, the “free encyclopedia that anyone
can edit.” It is available in several languages
including Shqip and Walon; the English
version started in 2001 and by December 2008
had more than 2.5 million articles. Googling
exotic terms will almost certainly yield links to
Wikipedia sites, which may be a sign of its
quality, and is certainly a sign of its popularity.
Other multilingual free-content projects
include
Wiktionary,
Wikibooks,
and
Wikinews.
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MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH
QUESTIONS
That Wikipedia is offered for free will
not be surprising to information economists.
Indeed, information goods are characterized by
high up-front costs and virtually zero marginal
costs of production. Since competition will
drive prices to marginal costs, much of
information on the Internet will be offered for
“free,” (or equivalently, sold with zero price
tags). Even Britannica, the well-respected
commercial encyclopedia, had to reduce its
price for its full volume to a fraction of what it
had charged consumers for years.
But what is surprising about Wikipedia,
and other free Wiki efforts is that the high upfront costs are not as significant. Wikipedia is
a collaborative effort that anyone can
contribute to. Wiki as a technology reduces
publishing costs to virtually zero. A question
about the reliability of Wikipedia articles then
immediately follows. Can Net users gather
information from Wikipedia with a reasonable
degree of comfort about its reliability?
Wikipedia has received much criticism
in the past about the accuracy of its contents
(CNN.com, 2005). Wikipedia often responded
by making changes to its design. In December
2005 for example, Wikipedia considered
requiring users to register before creating or
editing
articles.
Whereas
previously,
Wikipedia users did not require any formal
registration process to make even the most
drastic changes to an article. This was in
response to a complaint in an op-ed published
in USA Today by a prominent journalist, John
Seigenthaler, also a former administrative
assistant to Robert Kennedy. An article in
Wikipedia had claimed he had been suspected
in the assassination of the former attorney
general, and President John F. Kennedy
(Goodin, 2005). In December 2005, following
the Seigenthaler controversy, the New York
Times banned their reporters from using
Wikipedia as a research tool (Musil 2005).
And yet increasingly, Wikipedia
articles are being cited in many other
traditionally trusted outlets such as newspaper
columns (c.f. Drost, 2005). A favorite example
cited by Wikipedia themselves is their use by
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CONTRIBUTION
The primary contribution of this
paper is its explanation for the paradoxical
growth of the public good Wikipedia, a free
encyclopedia that anyone can edit. To our
knowledge, our explanation is novel and
contributes to the general literature on
public goods. The paper also offers
theoretical explanations for the surprising
empirical findings on the superior quality of
the giant encyclopedia arising from freeediting. This paper should be highly
interesting to researchers engaged in the
economic modeling of information systems
projects, particularly because of the
uniqueness of Wikipedia and its difference
from (other) Open Source Systems. It
should also be of interest to practitioners,
given the increasing popularity of
Wikipedia and Wiki technology.
the Parliament of Canada website as a “further
reading” resource on the topic of same-sex
marriage. Sreenath Srinivasan, dean and
professor of Journalism at Columbia
University first doubted Wikipedia but soon
was surprised by its apparent reliability. Jimmy
Wales, Wikipedia‟s founder, intends that
Wikipedia should achieve a “Britannica or
better” quality. This may seem almost
unrealistically ambitious, as “Encyclopaedia
Britannica” is the oldest English-language
general encyclopedia, first published in 1768.
Recent articles in the popular press and media
however indicated that Wales‟ goal with
Wikipedia may very well be achievable.
CNN.com (2005) citing a study by Nature
(Giles, 2005) claimed that “Wikipedia [was] as
accurate as Britannica.” They referred to the
Seigenthaler case, calling it “the exception
rather than the rule.”
Wikipedia‟s splendid growth is
particularly surprising if it is to be assessed
within a “rational” framework. That Wikipedia
is free makes it a public good. While
contributors may get some benefit from it,
many other users will simply try to free-ride.
Traditional economic theory suggests that
Wikipedia as a public good will be subject to
the tragedy of under-provision. Such under-
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provision of public goods is usually mitigated
through flavors of commercialization such as
privatization, auctioning, or subsidies. The
case of Wikipedia is however quite surprising.
Wikipedia when compared to Britannica, its
commercial counterpart, is much larger. If one
measure is the number of articles, Wikipedia
was already approximately 7 times larger in
2006 than Britannica which had approximately
120,000 articles then.

our modeling. Cornes (1993) develops
Hirshleifer‟s analysis further, studying the
effects of changes in income allocation. Varian
(1994) extends Hirshleifer‟s work by studying
the effects on equilibria when provision
involves sequential moves by the agents. The
results of the literature above do not apply so
readily to the case of Wikipedia since they all
predict very high levels of free-riding whereas
Wikipedia appears to be quite large.

Wikipedia would not be the first
information systems project that began as a
public good but resulted in a quality product.
Indeed, many successful open-source software
projects, such as Unix, were created ground-up
without the offering of any direct pecuniary
compensation. These products today are often
cited for their supremacy over related
commercially-produced products. How is the
case of Wikipedia then any different?

There have been studies that investigate
mechanisms in which free-riding is mitigated.
Andreoni (1990) and Cornes and Sandler
(1984) investigate the changes in results
whenever consumers are allowed benefits
directly from their private contribution in
addition to the level of the public good. While
we believe that their work is relevant, we
investigate how Wiki technology in particular
is able to mitigate free-riding, perhaps beyond
the effects of “warm-glow” feelings suggested
by Andreoni (1990) and Cornes and Sandler
(1984).

To summarize, the main research
questions we ask in this paper are as follows:


How can we explain the surprising
empirical findings that an encyclopedia
that anyone can edit is of a high quality?



How can we explain the surprisingly large
size of Wikipedia, when it is a public good
(created by people and used by people)?



How is the case of Wikipedia different
from Open Source Software development,
another information systems project that is
a public good and where neither quality
nor provision is compromised?

RELATED LITERATURE
For our analysis, we invoke the solution
concept of Nash (1950) equilibrium, since we
model the contribution to Wikipedia as a noncooperative game. To analyze situations
involving sequential moves, we also consider
Stackelberg equilibria, which in concept are
the natural applications of the Nash
equilibrium solution to dynamic games.
In addition, the stream of economics
literature related to the private provision of
public goods is relevant. Hirshleifer (1983)
investigated the variation of public good
provision with three different technologies. We
use his seminal piece extensively as a basis for

Free-riding has been studied in a
variety of IT application contexts. Their
contexts, however, make their results too
specific for insights to extend readily over to
the Wikipedia case. Carlton and Chevalier
(2003), for example, investigates free-riding
and sales strategies for the Internet. Varian
(2004), as another example, studied free-riding
in the provision of (general) information
systems reliability. His study has a
probabilistic flavor, emphasizing the likelihood
of failure of information systems, and also
repeats the standard extreme free-riding result.
Two kinds of equilibria in games of
incomplete information are considered in our
paper. First, we consider cheap-talk equilibria
(cf. Gibbons, 1992) in dynamic games of
incomplete information when messaging is
“cheap” or costless, and hence receivers must
determine the credibility of the messages.
Second, we briefly talk about signaling
equilibria (cf. Vega-Redondo, 2003) when
players try to signal their types using costly
messaging techniques.
Wikipedia itself has been the subject in
a variety of studies. Most notably, Nature‟s
(Giles, 2005) study involved 42 articles
reviewed by experts to compare the prestigious
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Britannica to the free giant Wikipedia. Their
results indicated that the average scientific
entry in Wikipedia contained four errors or
omissions, while Britannica had three.
Nonetheless, Wikipedia is planning on testlaunching a reviewing program. Forte and
Bruckman (2005) investigate why people write
for Wikipedia even when the encyclopedia
does not provide bylines to credit authors for
their hard work by interviewing 22
Wikipedians. They are however unable to
derive economic explanations, and instead
suggest „softer‟ incentives such as engagement
in desirable activities. Finally, IBM research
(c.f. Wattenberg et al., 2007) uses
sophisticated HCI technology to track the
contribution by Wikipedians, and the growth
of Wikipedia articles. They find that while
most articles have been vandalized, “vandalism
is usually repaired extremely quickly.”

THE CONTRIBUTION PARADOX OF
WIKIPEDIA
We will begin by modeling Wikipedia
as a public good, and illustrate the standard
derivation of the free-rider result, and its
under-provision property. Suppose that there
are two agents, i  {1, 2} , and that each can
choose to contribute a level xi to Wikipedia.
This is in very general terms. It may refer to a
correction of an error, or the authoring of a
major article. Doing so, each agent i receives
a payoff of

ui  vi ( xi  x j )  ci ( xi )
where vi

(1)

is monotone concave function

increasing in the total contribution, and ci is
the cost function for that agent, and
j  {1, 2}, j  i .
Since (1) is key to our analysis, we will
explain its form. First, we are defining
Wikipedia to be xi  x j , the total contribution,
as it is created entirely by Internet users. Every
individual benefits from having such a website,
hence the function vi . That function is concave
to reflect the standard diminishing marginal
utility assumption. For each individual, the net
utility depends also on the cost of his own
contribution.
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It is easy to recognize (1) as the utility
function of agents in a game involving the
private provision of a public good. And it is
easy to envision Wikipedia in the same
context. Every Internet citizen can potentially
benefit from having Wikipedia. Contributing to
Wikipedia however will involve a positive cost
function. Not surprisingly, we can intuitively
expect free-riding as a result. That is, more
people will simply use Wikipedia than
contribute to it. We shall now derive that
standard result.
First, we need to determine the reaction
functions and Nash equilibria for this
simultaneous contribution game. A reaction
function fi ( x j ) gives the optimal strategy of
agent i given a choice of x j by agent j ,
j  {0,1}, j  i . Let the reaction function of

agent i be given by fi . We assume that vi and
ci are twice continuously differentiable for all
i . The first-order condition is given by

vi' ( xi  x j )  ci' ( xi ) .
If we assume that ci is linear in xi ,
ci ( xi )  i xi , where i is a positive constant,

and that vi' has an inverse, we can define

xˆi  (vi' )1 i .
If we solve for agent i ‟s contribution
under the first-order condition, we see that it is
xˆi  x j . To derive agent i ‟s reaction function
fi , we only need impose a non-negativity
constraint to get

fi ( x j )  max{xˆi  x j ,0} .
We can define and account for
differences in the tastes of the agents in terms
of xˆi . More formally, we say that agent i likes
Wikipedia better if and only if xˆi  xˆ j . This is
because xˆi can be defined as agent i ‟s
standalone contribution: the amount he
contributes to Wikipedia when the other agent
does not contribute at all.
We may plot the reaction functions f1
and f 2 of agents 1 and 2 on the same pair of
axes. This is given in figure 1. The x -axis
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gives values of x1 whereas the y -axis gives
*
1

*
2

values of x2 . Any point ( x , x ) where the two
response function will intersect will
correspond to a Nash equilibrium. This is
because at ( x1* , x2* ) , f1 ( x2* )  x1* , and

f2 ( x1* )  x2* which satisfies the definition of a
Nash equilibrium. When only one such point
exists, the Nash equilibrium is unique. Looking
at figure 1, the proposition that follows is then
immediate.
Paradox 1a: If the contribution to
Wikipedia is modeled as the standard
private provision game where the utility
functions have the form given in (1), there
exists a unique total size of the
encyclopedia in equilibrium. A Nash
equilibrium always exists, and is unique
when the two agents have different tastes.

how a growth paradox persists even as the
number of agents increases.
Suppose, without loss of generality,
agent 2 likes Wikipedia more than agent 1, that
is xˆ2  xˆ1 . Then in the unique Nash
equilibrium, agent 2 provides all of the
articles, and agent 1 free-rides. If xˆ2  xˆ1 , then
a plethora of Nash equilibria exist as the
reaction functions will coincide. But as is clear
from the figure, the total size will still be
unique in equilibrium.
Paradox 1b: In the two-agent provision
game of Wikipedia where the utility
functions have the form given in (1), all
contributions to Wikipedia are made by
the agent(s) who like it most. All other
agents free-ride.

Paradox 1a suggests that Wikipedia
cannot be expected to grow perpetually, which
clearly contradicts the continually growing
characteristic of Wikipedia that can be
observed. (Between January 2006 and
December 2008, Wikipedia tripled in size.)
While it was assumed that the number of
agents was fixed, shortly we will demonstrate

We now contrast that expected outcome
against the social optimum. The social problem
will solve
max  v1 ( x1  x2 )  v2 ( x1  x2 )  c1 ( x1 )  c2 ( x2 )
x1 , x2

s.t. x1  0, x2  0

x2
f1(x2)

Sometimes equilibrium w/ sequential
moves
Nash

equilibrium

w/

simultaneous

moves

f2(x1)

x1

Figure 1. Equilibria in the standard contribution game
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Without loss of generality let us
suppose 1  2 . It is clear then that the social
optimum is attained when agent 1 contributes
everything. The first-order condition then
becomes.

v1 ( x1  0) v2 ( x1  0)

 1 ,
x1
x1
which can be written simply as

v1' ( x1 )  v2' ( x1 )  1 .
We note that since v1 is concave,

v ( x1 ) is decreasing whereas 1 is a constant.
'
1

Since v2' ( x1 )  0 for all x1 , then the socially
optimal level of provision, x1s , is

x1s  xˆ1   ,
where   0 . A special case would involve
  x̂2 .
This leads us to state formally the
following:
Paradox 2:
In
the
two-agent
contribution game where the utility
function is of the form in (1), when
compared to the socially optimal case,
Wikipedia will always be under-provided.
Further, the wrong agent may contribute in
the sense that he may like Wikipedia
more, but is worse in quality.
The case of the wrong contributor i
will occur whenever xˆi  xˆ j , even though

i   j .
Our findings thus far are already
surprising. We expect Wikipedia to be smaller
in size to the case that is optimally social, as
Wikipedia can be treated as a public good.
This under-provision should be lacking or at
least lessened when financial incentives are
introduced. Indeed, subsidies and taxes are one
method of changing equilibria to points that
are social optima (Landsburg, 2001). So why is
it then that a purely commercial counterpart,
Britannica, is much smaller in size than
Wikipedia, the privately-provided public
good? At the very least it warrants further
analysis.
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One modification that can be made is to
the utility function. In our utility function for
individual agents given by (1), each agent
receives utility only from the total level of the
public good. This may be inconsistent with
real-life facts. Each agent may receive benefit
not only from the level of the public good, but
from his individual contribution as well.
Wikipedia provides several reasons why one
may contribute to the public good. Most of
these are along the lines of positive feelings
due to good-Samaritan deeds. For instance,
Wikipedia users are asked to contribute for the
poor child in Africa having no access to
expensive encyclopedia. Yet there are also
other direct benefits associated with
contributing. Let us consider the evolution of a
Wikipedian as he contributes to Wikipedia. He
is increasingly recognized as a reputable
volunteer, and is elevated to a higher status
such as that of an „administrator‟ and granted
distinct privileges.
The case where agents benefit directly
from their contribution in addition to the
overall level of the public good was
investigated by previous researchers. In
Andreoni‟s (1990) simple model, an agent‟s
utility function is a function of both his own
contribution, and the amount of the public
good. Andreoni‟s (1990) model is very
general, in that it captures altruism and its
antithesis, egoism, as well as “impure
altruism,” meant to capture concepts such as
the “warm-glow” felt by agents upon their
contribution to charities. Andreoni‟s (1990)
results however pertain to the effects of
income re-distribution between agents on the
contribution to charity. Cornes and Sandler‟s
(1984) result is more relevant. They show that
when a single act of contribution is able to
generate utility both directly and indirectly, as
community size increases, free riding and its
associated inefficiency may decrease. Their
model is set up as a standard consumer
behavior optimization problem.
An
alternative
explanation
for
Wikipedia‟s size when compared to Britannica
is based on the cost structure. Encyclopedia
fall under a class of goods known as
information goods. The production of these
goods is characterized by the necessary
existence of high up-front (fixed) costs, and
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virtually zero marginal costs. Britannica‟s
fixed costs would consist of two major
components. First, Britannica would need to
invest in signaling expenses, discussed in
detail in the next section. Second, Britannica
would incur costs in authoring articles for
inclusion in its encyclopedia. Britannica‟s
profits would depend on the number of
articles, as the following indicates. Let FC
stand for fixed cost, Cs for signaling cost, g
for a convex cost function increasing in k the
number of articles, TC for total cost, TR for
total revenue, and let  denote Britannica‟s
profits. Then
FC  Cs  g (k ) ,

TC  FC  0 ,

and
  TR  TC .
In the first-order condition, k * solves
TR
 g '(k ) .
k

Assuming that it exists, k * then is then
the unique number of articles selected by
Britannica for inclusion in its encyclopedia. As
the above system of equations indicates, this
k * depends on TR , which in turn is of course
determined by the demand and reservation
values of the consumers.
A noteworthy point is that Britannica‟s
choice of k * will not be socially optimal, and
it is straightforward to argue this. The socially
efficient price necessarily equals marginal cost.
But in Britannica‟s case, we can safely assume
this to be zero. So any non-zero price will
involve positive amounts of deadweight loss.
Of course, there is no solution to this social
inefficiency problem. Whenever a firm has
decreasing average costs at the socially
optimal point, as Britannica does, its profits
will be negative there. There is no easy way
however to compare the differences between
the degrees of suboptimality of the two
different cases.
Since Wikipedia use appears to be
growing, it is of interest how the overall
efficiency compares to the social optimum as

the number of agents using it increases. To see
that, we must analyze the problem in the
context of an arbitrary number of n agents.
We make the simplifying assumption that the
agents are all identical. In particular, vi and ci
are all identical i  1,..., n . First, let us view
the social optimum as a function of n . As
stated above, the whole range of equilibria are
possible since the tastes are identical, and since
the response functions fi will intersect in the
n -dimensional space at an infinite number of
points. All such equilibria satisfy the following
Nash requirement, that i

xi*  xˆ   x*j .
j i

But one equilibrium may be more
„intuitive,‟ and somewhat informally Pareto
optimal. Let us assume that in the Nash
equilibrium output, all of the agents exert
identical levels of effort. That is

x1*  x2*  ...  xn*  x* .
In the Nash equilibrium now,

x*  xˆ  (n 1) x* .
Solving for x* , one sees that
x* 

x̂
n

.

On the other hand, the social optimum
output is of course
nxˆ .

Let us define  , the relative efficiency as
follows:



xˆ
nxˆ .
n

Then  is simply the constant 1 n 2 ,
which has derivative 2 n3 . The following
proposition then is immediate.
Paradox 3:
When utility functions are
of the form in (1), and the agents are all
identical, the relative efficiency of
Wikipedia decreases rapidly as the
number of users n increases, even when
all the agents are contributing.
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As mentioned before, Wikipedia by
nature is very dynamic. Wikipedia grows not
only as new articles are created, but also as
extant articles are edited. The game of
contribution to Wikipedia discussed so far
however has been static in the sense that all
moves were simultaneous. It would be
interesting to investigate the change in the
equilibrium outcome if agents moved
sequentially. Varian (1994) investigated the
general theory of sequential contribution to
public goods. Our discussion below is based
on Varian (1994), albeit using a simpler
version of his elegant model.
Now the two agents move sequentially,
so the game of contribution is dynamic.
Suppose, without loss of generality, agent 1
moves first. Choosing x1 , he receives a utility
of
u1  v1 ( x1  x2 )  c1 ( x1 )

when agent 2 subsequently chooses x2 . Using
the reaction function of 2, we can write the
right-hand-side equivalently as
u1  v1 ( x1  f 2 ( x1 ))  c1 ( x1 )

or
u1  v1 ( x1  max{xˆ2  x1})  c1 ( x1 )

The reaction function can be used to
split agent 1‟s utility into the following system
of two equations,
u1 ( x1 )  v1 ( x1 )  c1 ( x1 )

if x1  xˆ2

u1 ( x1 )  v1 (xˆ2 )  c1 ( x1 )

if x1  xˆ2 ,

since for any level of contribution x1
by agent 1, agent 2 will always contribute x2
at least and just enough so that the total
x1  x2  xˆ2 .

Two cases will arise, depending on the
difference in preferences of the two agents. In
the first case, xˆ1  xˆ2 , that is agent 1 likes
Wikipedia less than agent 2. In that case, agent
1 will always choose to free-ride on agent 2
and contribute nothing to Wikipedia. To see
that, first note agent 1‟s choice between a
strictly positive contribution, x1  0 , or free-
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riding completely, x1  0 . For any choice
x1  0 , he will receive a net benefit of
v1 ( xˆ2 )  c( x1 ) ,

as agent 2 will always provide the remainder of
the positive good. In free-riding completely
however, agent 1 can receive higher net
benefits as doing so will cost him nothing.
That is, free-riding will yield a net benefit of
v1 ( xˆ2 ) .
The second case is more complicated,
and more interesting. The first-mover, agent 1,
likes the good more. That is xˆ1  xˆ2 . As in the
first case, if agent 1 chooses to free-ride
completely, he can ensure a net-benefit of at
least v1 ( xˆ2 ) . Although this is less than v1 ( xˆ1 ) ,
agent 1 may still free-ride completely as a
positive contribution by agent 1 entails costs
that he will incur, and the net benefit he will
derive is given by
v1 ( xˆ1 )  c1 ( xˆ1 ) .

If this net benefit v1 ( xˆ1 )  c1 ( xˆ1 ) is
greater than v1 ( xˆ2 ) , agent 1 will provide all of
the good himself, whereas if it is smaller, agent
1 will free-ride entirely. This is quite surprising
as a result when we recall that agent 1 likes the
good better. It is interesting to highlight the
cases when free-riding by agent 1 will occur,
even when he likes the good better. One case
may be when tastes are similar. Indeed, if x̂2 is
less than x̂1 but x̂2 is large enough, then agent
1 will free-ride.
The analysis above may explain a
seemingly
strange
behavior
by
the
administrators of Wikipedia. On Wikipedia‟s
website, the administrators encourage all users
to be “bold” and make changes to any of
Wikipedia‟s articles, even the same article with
that message itself. Where the stability and
reliability of the articles is a concern, one
would perhaps expect some form of mandatory
registration process, or at least a message of a
much different tone, such as the following
perhaps:
“Please author an article only if you are
completely sure of its contents. Please do
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not make changes to an article unless you
are completely certain of its faults.”
Our analysis shows however that
when moves are sequential, it may be
advantageous to have the agent who likes the
good least move first as doing so will result in
a higher level of contribution. This is because
the other agent will not have any option of
free-riding, and will always provide all of the
good, and hence a „higher‟ level of the good
will result. When Wikipedia administrators ask
users to be “bold” and make changes, it may
act as a signal to the high-level contributors
that their moves are all that remain. Similarity
of preferences was mentioned above as one
case when we will see free-riding by agent 1
even when he likes the good better. In
Wikipedia, the similarity in tastes will
probably feature prominently as the number of
users is large, and preference may actually be a
continuous variable.
We end our discussion related to the
contribution to Wikipedia by considering the
case of Open-Source Software (OSS), which is
another category of “public-good” projects in
Information Technology that also exhibits the
paradoxical growth and high-quality. In doing
so we shall highlight what distinguishes
Wikipedia from OSS, in order to demonstrate
both the novelty and the validity of our work.
Open-Source development projects as
public-goods are driven in growth by the
seemingly altruistic efforts of a variety of
individuals. As with Wikipedia, of wonder has
been the effect of voluntary provision on both
the quality and amounts of such open-source
efforts (cf. Lerner and Tirole, 2000). And as
with Wikipedia, open-source projects are
surprisingly impressive in quality, and found in
abundance. A considerable amount of research
has been conducted to investigate this apparent
contradiction to the traditional findings related
to the private provision of public goods. The
theoretical explanation that seems most
feasible (Lerner and Tirole, 2002) is that
participation in open-source projects allows
developers to effectively signal their skills to
ensure higher levels of future returns. One may
be tempted to suggest that contribution to
Wikipedia may be explained away in a similar
manner, that individuals are editing articles to

signal their higher “quality.” We contend
however that such contributions to Wikipedia
cannot constitute a signaling activity, and
provide an intuitive explanation. Users cannot
effectively signal their “quality” because
reward structures based on such signals cannot
be justified. Simply put, if better articles were
rewarded for, then agents could easily acquire
the information at nominal costs from other
sources, such as Britannica, and the bases for
rewards would be unfounded.
An Explanation for Wikipedia’s Size
So far, we have been able to reproduce
only the extreme free-riding result that is
standard in the public goods economics
literature. Clearly though, the abstraction in the
model is far too rigid to be true in practice.
Instead of extreme free-riding, what we can
readily observe in Wikipedia is a variety of
contribution levels. The empirical study by
Nature (Giles, 2005) suggests that there is
some free-riding with only about 10% of the
scientists it surveyed contributing to articles.
Most articles seem to be the result of generally
cooperative effort with partial contributions
from a large number of users. Some
contributors seem to be highly excited by their
topics of interest while being indifferent to
other topics. Finally, some articles seem to be
reactive to others and quite large, such as the
article on the late scientist Lisa Meitner who
was failed to be recognized for her work in
collaboration with the Nobel laureate Otto
Hahn.
In this section, we modify our model
and offer an explanation for Wikipedia‟s size.
We introduce a new property of agents known
as “type.” Suppose agent i has type ti  0 . In
contributing xi the agent receives a payoff of

ui  vi ( xi  x j (1  (ti  t j )2 ))  ci ( xi ) (2)
where vi is again a monotone concave
function, and ci  i xi is the cost function for
that agent. The payoff model above is
straightforward and intuitive. From the other
agent‟s contribution, an agent receives utility
that is moderated by the degree of similarity
between the two agents. For example, an
economist may care little about a psychology
article, and at the very extreme, a liberal may
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actually receive disutility from the presence of
a conservative‟s article on say abortion. The
first-order condition is given by

We can state the most important result:

Once again, we can define xˆi as

Proposition 1a:
In the two-agent
contribution game with the utility function
of the agents having the form given in (2),
as the difference between the preferences
of the agents (ti  t j )2 increases, the free-

xˆi  (v i' )1 i

rider problem of Wikipedia as a public
good is mitigated.

assuming linear costs and the existence of the
inverse of vi' . Now suppose agent j
contributes xˆi . Some algebra shows that agent
i „s best response is to provide

From the figure, we see that the exact
Nash equilibrium outcome will depend on the
magnitude of (ti  t j )2 . The dashed lines are

vi' ( xi  x j (1  (ti  t j )2 ))  i

xˆi (ti  t j )  0
2

whenever ti  t j , and quite surprisingly,

xˆi (ti  t j )2  xˆi

the different response functions of the two
agents with different values of (ti  t j )2 . The
points of intersection highlighted as Nash
equilibria correspond to pairs of response
functions with the same values of (ti  t j )2 .
When (ti  t j )2 is small enough, then complete

whenever (ti  t j )  1 . So even though agent
2

j is contributing the entire amount that agent
i would have contributed himself, agent i
cannot simply free-ride as agent j ‟s
preferences are different. The results are more
clear if we plot the response functions fi ( x j ) .
This is given in Figure 2.

x2

free-riding will result, as long as one agent
prefers Wikipedia more than the other. At an
intermediate level of (ti  t j )2 , the two agents
offer their standalone contributions. Now even
though agent 1 is offering his original
contribution, agent 2 is not free riding

(t1  t2 )2  1
f1(x2)

Nash Equilibria

f2(x1)

x1

Figure 2 Equilibria in the contribution game with different preferences
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anymore. Finally, if (ti  t j )2 is very large,
then the Nash equilibrium is the outermost
point, where both agents are reactively
contributing very large amounts. We state that
more formally below.
Proposition 1b:
Suppose, without
loss of generality, xˆ j  xˆi , and that

  xˆi , four regions of (ti  t j )2 can be
associated with four different kinds of
equilibria:


If 0  (ti  t j ) 2 

xˆ j  xˆi
xˆ j

, agent i will

free-ride entirely on agent j as in
equilibrium xi  0 . In addition,
x j  xˆ j .


If

xˆ j  xˆi
xˆ j

 (ti  t j ) 2  1 , agent i will

free-ride partially on agent j as in
equilibrium 0  xi  xˆi .


If (ti  t j )  1 , then agent i will not
2

free-ride at all, being indifferent to
agent j „s contribution. The outcome is
( xˆi , xˆ j ) which can often be socially
efficient.


If (ti  t j )2  1 , then both agents
contribute at levels that are high, but
which can often be socially inefficient.

Proof: {Sketch} To derive region 1, first from
figure 2 it is clear that agent i will stop free
riding as soon as fi ( xˆ j )  0 . We note that

fi ( xˆ j )  0 is given by
xi  xˆi  xˆ j (1  (ti  t j )2 ).
In that case, a little algebra can show
that the condition on (ti  t j )2 is that it should
be larger than

xˆ j  xˆi
xˆ j

. Deriving the rest of the

regions is straightforward, and we omit it.
We can demonstrate the meaning of the
ranges by means of an example. Suppose we
have two contributors, where one agent likes

Wikipedia more. Suppose the article to be
created is to profile a prominent conservative
politician. If our two agents are both
supporters of the politician, and so (ti  t j )2 is
fairly small and in region 1, then the agent who
likes Wikipedia more will author the article
entirely. Suppose instead that one agent likes
the politician‟s stance on opposing outsourcing
labor, whereas the other agent likes his stance
on the environment. Then (ti  t j )2 is in region
2, and agent 1 will not contribute everything.
This is probably most reflective of Wikipedia‟s
editing scenario, where free-editing allows
individuals to contribute what they value most
in the form of small edits. Suppose one agent
supports the politician as a union member
strongly opposed to outsourcing, whereas the
other agent supports him as an environmental
activist. Then (ti  t j )2 is in region 3, and each
agent will write their version of the article
being indifferent to each other‟s contribution.
Finally, if one agent is liberal, then (ti  t j )2 is
in region 4, and we may expect two different
articles, one with a liberal focus and another
with a conservative focus.

RELIABILITY OF WIKIPEDIA
In this section, we extend our model of
the contribution game to account for reliability.
In a general setting involving n potential
contributors, let the contribution by agent i be
described by qi  0 , where qi is the quality of
that contribution. The quality of Wikipedia
then is a function of q1 , q2 ,..., qn . One
particular function that is well suited as a
definition of quality for Wikipedia is the
geometric mean given by
1/ n

 n 
Q    qi 
 i 1 

.

Although this definition may appear
somewhat arbitrary, or even strange as a
choice, it is well suited as it captures the idea
that “weaker-links” are more significant.
Weaker-links in the context of public goods
have been studied by Cornes (1993), albeit
within the setting of a general model. A closely
related concept is that of the Cobb-Douglas
function in the context of public goods (cf.
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Varian, 1984). It is clear that this definition
captures the essence of “weaker-links” when
we take its derivative with respect to qi ,
Q
Q

qi nqi

.

Clearly, the marginal effects on total
reliability Q are higher whenever qi is lower.
In terms of the reliability of Wikipedia,
“weaker-links” will determine whether or not
Wikipedia can be trusted in general as a
source. If it is known a priori only that a few
articles are inaccurate, without knowing which
ones exactly, then potentially all articles
should be approached with caution, or at least
verified using other sources. To simplify our
analysis, we may consider the special case of
“weaker-links,” which is the case when
reliability is determined by the “weakest-link.”
In that case, if it is known a priori only that a
single article is inaccurate, without knowing
exactly which one, then without verification
potentially any article may be the inaccurate
one and the reliability of the entire project is in
question.

We may model the
concept by redefining quality as
Q  min{q1 ,..., qn }

(3)

To solve for the equilibrium
contribution qualities, we first need to derive
the reaction functions. Suppose vi and ci are
functions as before but accepting qi as the
input parameter instead. Also let n  2 . Agent
i will receive the following in net benefit by
contributing qi :

ui  vi (min{qi , q j })  ci (qi )
Let us capture differences in tastes by
the constants q̂1 and q̂2 , which are the
maximum levels of qualities that agent 1 and
agent 2 would care for Wikipedia to have
respectively. It is then straightforward to show
that for agent i , it is optimal to match the
other agent‟s contribution if it is less than q̂1 or
provide q̂1 otherwise.
functions are given by

So

the

fi (q j )  min{q j , qˆi }

q2

f1(q2)
f2(q1)

A Nash equilibrium w/ simultaneous moves.
Always unique equilibrium w/ sequential moves

q1
Figure 3 Reliability equilibria in the contribution game

92

weakest-link

reaction

An Analysis of Wikipedia

Without loss of generality suppose qˆ1  qˆ2 .
Plotting the reaction functions in figure 3, we
can clearly see that there exists a plethora of
Nash equilibria. We may select the one that
Pareto dominates the other as it may perhaps
be the most likely outcome. In that Nash
equilibrium the reliability of Wikipedia is
given by min{qˆ1 , qˆ2 }  qˆ1 .
An interesting extension of the result
above is that uniqueness of Nash equilibria can
easily be established if moves are assumed to
be sequential and hence the game dynamic.
The uniqueness result for the general model
was argued by Hirshleifer (1983) and
established by Varian (2004). The argument
for uniqueness is as follows. Let agent 1,
without loss of generality have the first move.
Agent 1 will choose min{qˆ1 , qˆ2 } . Choosing
any amount larger will result in forgone
benefits and useless costs when the subsequent
choice will be less. Choosing any amount
smaller is not the best option.
Proposition 2a:
When reliability
of Wikipedia is defined as in (3) in the
sequential two-agent game, the unique
equilibrium level of reliability of
Wikipedia is the least of the minimum
levels desired by contributors.
This result above appears „mixed,‟ in
that its optimality is not clear. At first glance, it
is reassuring to realize that the equilibrium
reliability will most likely be at least above a
bare minimum threshold. But two questions
arise subsequently. How does this compare
with the reliability that is socially optimal?
And is such a threshold level of reliability
„good-enough,‟ per se?
To determine Wikipedia‟s equilibrium
reliability to the socially optimal case, we note
that the social objective is to maximize the
following social utility function, by choosing
q1 and q2 accordingly.
U s  v1 (min{q1 , q2 })  v2 (min{q1 , q2 })  c1 (q1 )  c2 (q2 )

In the social optimum, level, all agents
need to be contributing articles of the same
quality. This is easy to argue using
contradiction. Suppose that q1  q2 . Without
loss of generality, let q1  q2 . If q1  qs , the

socially optimal quality level, then reliability
will be compromised. If on the other hand
q1  qs even though reliability is at the
socially optimum level, social welfare can still
be improved since c2 (.) is increasing in q and
agent 2 can increase his private benefits by
compromising the quality of his contribution.
So the socially optimal point is the single level
of quality, say qs , in contribution that solves

max U s
q

Although qs is hard to solve, we can
still draw insights from analyzing various
cases. Suppose the choice of qs is between q̂1
and q̂2 where q̂1 < q̂2 . It is already clear that
either one may be more optimal in equilibrium,
depending on vi and ci . To allow for further
analysis, let us simplify the matter and make
all vi „s identical, and as before ci „s linear
functions. Since the Nash equilibrium outcome
is expected to be a choice of q̂1 , let us first
consider otherwise. In choosing q̂2 , agent one
will need to make a suboptimal choice that will
decrease his net utility by
v(qˆ1 )  v(qˆ2 )  1 (q)

where q  qˆ2  qˆ1 . On the other hand, agent
2‟s loss from agent 1 selecting q̂1 is given by
v(qˆ2 )  v(qˆ1 )  2 (q)

We see that agent 2 will choose q̂1 in
the socially optimal case whenever
q 

2[v(qˆ2 )  v(qˆ1 )]
.
1  2

The above analysis leads us to state the
following proposition without proof.
Proposition 2b:
The reliability of
Wikipedia, when defined by (3) in the
two-agent game, will be compromised
when compared to the socially optimal
case if quality preferences are close
enough. If quality preferences are far
apart, then Wikipedia will have the
socially optimal quality level.
Of course, in the analysis thus far, we
assumed that no individual would be interested
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in deliberately destroying the reliability of
Wikipedia. That is, we considered only
situations when individuals make the choice
solely between benevolent contributions or
free-riding. Wikipedia however is subject to
“vandalism” in that perfect articles can be
edited arbitrarily by individuals interested in
deliberately
undermining
Wikipedia‟s
reliability. To incorporate vandalism into the
model, one needs only to introduce agents with
the appropriate structure of the utility function.
At this point, we suggest no normative
guidelines for mitigating this problem. Instead,
we highlight that self-regulation will be
possible insofar as there are agents who endure
significant disutility from vandalism actions.
At the very least, these agents can always
change an article back to its original state.
Obviously, at any point in time an article may
be the subject of vandalism, and that fact may
not be clear to the casual user. It may be
worthwhile for users to check the time-stamped
history of the article to determine whether they
can reliably use it for references.
We can still model the concept of
vandalism and demonstrate equilibrium
outputs as follows. Suppose there are two
agents, a vandal and one other who is a
benefactor whom we call the contributor.
Suppose the vandal has the following utility
function

v  c(d ) if d  x
uv  
c (d ) if d  x

(4)

when he contributes an amount d of damage
to Wikipedia, while x is the positive
contribution of the benefactor.
In that function v is the benefit the
vandal derives whenever the reliability of
Wikipedia is compromised, and c is the cost
function increasing in d . Suppose the
contributor has the following utility function

v( x)   x if x  d
uc  
 x if x  d

(5)

where v is again increasing monotone,
concave in x , and   0 is a cost constant.
We now need to derive the response
functions. We start with the response function
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f v of the vandal, as that is easier. For each
value of x , the vandal needs to choose
between a positive contribution d  0 or
abstaining from vandalism. A positive
contribution will be better if and only if
 and d  x . The optimal positive
v  cd
contribution d * will be infinitesimally larger
than x . To derive the full response function
f c of the contributor, we note that the choice
is between a positive contribution x  0 and
no contribution. For x  0 , there is always a
unique positive x* that solves
max v( x)  cx
x

So the choice is between x* and x  0 .
The condition for reliability to be maintained
in equilibrium is of course that x*  v  . This
c
leads us to state the following.
Proposition 2c:
In the two-agent
(a vandal and a contributor) game of
Wikipedia where the utility functions are
of the form in (4) and (5) articles in
equilibrium will not sway back and forth
between vandals and contributors. To
prevent vandalism of an article in the
unique equilibrium outcome, the least
quality preference among those of the
editors should be at least equal to the
benefit derived from vandalism.
Although never due to vandalism, there
is one situation when articles may sway back
and forth through editing. When readers are
unsure of the contents of an article, and have
no way of verifying their accuracy, the article
may be subject to repeated editing by polarised
editors. The situation may be exacerbated by
the fact that editing is not a „costly‟ activity.
Consequently, we may use the solution concept
of cheap-talk equilibria (cf. Gibbons, 1992)
that investigate credibility in environments
sustaining costless messaging.
Suppose chance draws an editor‟s type
to be either a „lying‟ or „honest‟ individual.
The editor behaves according to his type and
edits an article. The users of Wikipedia then
have the option of believing or disbelieving the
contents of the article, but have no idea about
the true type of the editor. Whether believing
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or disbelieving occurs in equilibrium will
depend on the fulfilment of three conditions,
and eventually on the payoffs to the editor and
users. The first condition is that the users‟
preferred actions will need to depend on the
type of the editor. This condition is trivially
fulfilled; users will prefer to believe honest
editors and disbelieve others. The second
condition is that editors must have different
preferences across the users‟ strategies. This
condition fails to be fulfilled. Both types of
editors would like users to believe them.
Although the third condition does not need to
be stated, we do so anyway for the sake of
completeness. That condition requires that the
editors‟ and users‟ preferences not be
completely opposed. This condition is also not
fulfilled with Wikipedia. Specifically, users
prefer to believe when editors are honest and
disbelieve otherwise. But lying editors prefer
that users believe, and hence communication
cannot occur.
That many Wikipedia articles cannot or
will not be believed by users is not a result that
is destructive to the value of the project.
Rather, we contend that it is a major strength.
In particular, the polarization result of freeediting in Wikipedia will act as a perfect
signalling device to users for highlighting
situations when they should disbelieve articles
that may be highly opinionated and less
factual. This is one explanation for the
common saying about Wikipedia that even
amidst discourse and vandalism, the actual
discourse itself may be informative. This
communication feature of Wikipedia may be a
great strength in the face of its commercial
counterparts, such as Britannica. First, users of
Britannica may not be able to discern
opinionated articles that are further from truth
from those that are more factually correct.
Further, these articles will often be believed
because the three conditions of cheap-talk
equilibria highlighted above may often be
fulfilled even after critique by a review
committee.
In terms of the design mechanism, we
may be interested in seeing what the effect will
be of punishing vandals. Suppose, for example,
that vandals‟ IP addresses are logged and then
future activities blocked.

THE COLLABORATIVE NET
Today, a striking Internet phenomenon
can easily be spotted. We call this
phenomenon the “Collaborative Net,” and it is
a culmination of an information pool created
mostly by most of its users. The simplest
technological introductions are enabling this
phenomenon, which in turn is drastically
redefining properties of the Internet. In
addition to wiki, blogs are such a technological
innovation and the blogosphere is a
Collaborative Net feature.
One direct consequence of the dynamic
blogosphere is a concept known as “citizen
journalism.” Other terms used to describe the
same concept include “grassroots reporting,”
or “media-of-the-masses.” Citizen journalism
as a topic has been investigated in journalism
studies (cf. Andrews, 2003; Blood, 2003;
Regan, 2004). Lasica (2003) for example
defines it as “individuals playing an active role
in the process of collecting, reporting, sorting,
analysing and disseminating news and
information, a task once reserved almost
exclusively to the news media,” and contends
that the transparency of blogging has
contributed to increase the accessibility of
news entities. While traditional periodic
sources of information involved professional
activities, such as television news programs or
magazines and other periodicals, citizen
journalism is providing Internet surfers
alternative sources. Features remarkable about
citizen journalism are its vast size and its
provision by ordinary citizens. These features
become strikingly apparent particularly when
citizen journalism is compared to the
mainstream media industry, as the latter can be
characterized by its composition of a limited
set of players. Of concern is the credibility of
the information reported through citizen
journalism channels; is the information
provided through citizen journalism reliable?
In contrast, many mainstream media players
have well-established reputations, with famous
journalists possessing enviable credentials. An
understanding of the credibility of information
reported becomes even more important with
new practices by Internet news aggregators. In
a recent article titled “Can You Tell Blogs
From „Real‟ News?” in Forbes, Dicarlo (2005)
observes that blogs and other user-generated
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content will soon show up on Yahoo!, blurring
the lines between professional media and
citizen journalism.
The results established in this paper
have implications for the Collaborative Net
feature of citizen journalism. By means of our
main result, we have established that when
preferences are sufficiently different, the
underprovision problem of public goods
resulting is mitigated as extreme free-riding is
no longer feasible. This result, and our analysis
in general will extend over easily to citizen
journalism. The popularity of citizen
journalism comprising blogs is often attributed
to the failure of traditional media outlets to
cover a wide enough variety of articles. In
2005 for example, bloggers championed the
case of a missing woman which did not receive
national media attention as that of Laci
Peterson. According to the bloggers, the
missing woman was poor and African
American, and deemed unworthy of media
attention unlike the attractive Peterson
(Farivar, 2005). Our analysis showed that
traditional print media (such as Britannica)
will be unable to cover all of these articles.
Citizen journalism however may not be as
accurate as Wikipedia when readers will have
no way to verify the content. We have already
mentioned that in games of incomplete
information, under three conditions cheap-talk
equilibria are possible when information
cannot be verified. Further, unlike Wikipedia,
the publisher of a blog has full control over the
contents of an article. Consequently, highly
opinionated articles can easily prevail. An
example of this was the appearance of
numerous faceless blogs that successfully
defended G. W. Bush during the 2004
elections when his service record was in
question.

DISCUSSION
Wikipedia is attracting both crowds and
criticism. Users are drawn to Wikipedia not
only by its tempting free-offering, but also
because it contains articles on almost every
conceivable topic. Why is Wikipedia so large,
even as a public good? And can we trust
articles that “anyone can edit?”
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The first characteristic of Wikipedia we
investigated was its sheer size. Since
Wikipedia can be considered a public-good,
we demonstrated how traditional theory would
suggest that the standard free-rider problem
would emerge. In equilibrium, only a few
volunteers would contribute. But this result
would obviously contradict the empirical
observation that Wikipedia is roughly seven
times as large as its commercial counterpart.
Consequently, we investigated mechanisms in
which extreme free-riding was being mitigated.
Our main result in this paper was an
explanation for the size of Wikipedia based on
equilibrium contributions depending on the
differences in types. Free-editing allows for a
variety of expressions; expressions that reflect
differences in type. In addition, using wellgrounded
principles
from
information
economics, we explained why Wikipedia‟s
commercial counterpart could be much smaller
in size.
The second characteristic of the
Wikipedia we investigated was its reliability.
This characteristic is currently a topic of much
debate. Indeed, while many critics of
Wikipedia are highly skeptical about the
reliability of this free-encyclopedia that anyone
can edit, surprising results are emerging
regarding Wikipedia‟s reliability. Our results
were important as we are able to establish both
lower and upper bounds for the reliability of
Wikipedia.
Qualitatively,
Wikipedia‟s
definition as a public good, combined with
free-riding and free-editing helps to maintain
the reliability of Wikipedia.
We identified Wikipedia as part of a
general Internet phenomenon that we call the
Collaborative Net. The effect that the simple
technologies enabling the Collaborative Net
inspires awe. Increasingly, users are adopting
more active roles. Previously, Net users were
frequently called “browsers.” And they were
exactly that, being unable to edit most of the
information online. Today, more and more Net
users are actually the contributors to a vast
pool of information as bloggers or contributors
to Wiki projects. This pool of information is
characteristically dynamic with changes being
made to it constantly.
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The primary contribution of this paper
is its novel explanation for the paradoxical
growth of Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
that anyone can edit. To our knowledge, our
explanation is novel and contributes to the
general literature on public goods. The paper
also offers theoretical explanations for the
surprising empirical findings on the superior
quality of the giant encyclopedia arising from
free-editing. Our findings have implications for
the much-debated topic of credibility in the
new Collaborative Net environment. We also
highlight the uniqueness of Wikipedia when
compared to (other) Open Source Systems.
Our study features prominently as we
are able to assess contribution and reliability
within the traditional economic paradigm, in
contrast to other studies. Benkler (2006) for
example examines the contribution to blogs
and wiki projects from a social-capital
perspective. In additional to its theoretical
appeal, our study is also of practical relevance
as wiki projects will feature as options
alternative to traditional knowledge poolmodels. Knowledge-management, for example,
can be implemented in organizations very
efficiently by the use of information systems
that are designed similar to Wikipedia.
The main limitation of our study was
the use of two-person games to model
contributions to Wikipedia when in reality
Wikipedia involves the contributions of
thousands of individuals. We believe however
that the insights generated are still valid for at
least three reasons. First, our aim was not to
derive accurate numerical results, but instead
to gain an understanding of the behavior. We
are convinced that two-person games are

sufficient for that purpose, particularly since
they are the standard in studying provisions to
public goods (c.f. Varian, 1994). Second, in
many cases richer games are a collection of
smaller games, and in Wikipedia, the
contribution game will often be reduced to the
final two individuals who like it most. Third,
mathematically, many of our results will still
hold when considering n -dimensional vectors.
While Wikipedia offers many areas of
future research such as the social and legal
aspects of a free-to-edit information source, we
would particularly suggest studying the
specific design features of wiki-based
information systems. One may investigate, for
instance, incentives to remain neutral with
varying levels of policing. Such studies would
further highlight the suitability of Wikipedia
and other wiki-based projects as reliable,
unbiased information systems for use in
effective knowledge-management. This area is
particularly
promising
as
commercial
applications of wiki technology are emerging.
Many online retailers including Amazon.com
are implementing wiki-based review systems,
and ShopWiki.com is an entire online business
based on user-generated reviews published
using wiki. A blogger recently reported that he
was offered a contract by a Microsoft PR
associate to edit a Wikipedia article the
associate felt was biased against Microsoft
technology (Jelliffe, 2007). While the associate
maintained that it was only intended to be
compensation for using a neutral voice, several
interesting questions arise that relate to
conflicts of interest, and the effects of
pecuniary compensation on the overall
neutrality of wiki articles.
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